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perty used in the manufacture. The law was subsequently modified, limiting its operation to persons engaging in the manufacture
prior to August 1st 1861, limiting the exemption to five years,
and the amount of bounty money to one person to $5000. The
modification was held valid; the original act was not a contract by
the state with persons engaging in the manufacture of salt; it was
a law dictated by public policy and the general good, a bounty law,
like the laws offering rewards for the killing of destructive animals;
one that might be changed whenever the legislative body thought
fit to change or modify its policy on the subject: Salt Co. v.
East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373.
W. 1I. BURROUGHS.
(To be continued.)
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The transferee of stock on the books of an insurance company, on which the
full nominal value has not been paid, is liable for calls on the unpaid portion made
during his ownership, without an express promise.
The capital stock of a business corporation is a trust fund for the protection of
creditors, and neither stockholders nor directors can withhold or release any part
of it from the claims of such creditors.
The stock in this sense is the whole stock, not merely the percentage of it
called in or paid.

Ix error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois.
The Great Western Insurance Company, of which the plaintiff
below was the assignee in bankruptcy, was incorporated under the
laws of Illinois in 1857, with general power to insure all kinds of
property against both fire and marine losses. Subsequently to its
organization its capital was increased to more than one million of
dollars, and it was authorized by law further to increase its capital
to $5,000,000. It did not appear, however, from the record, that
of the stock subscribed more than about $222,000 was ever paid
in, a sum equal to nearly twenty per cent. of the par value, leaving over $965,000 of subscribed capital unpaid. In this condition
the company went into bankruptcy in 1872, owing a very large sum,
equal to if not greater than its entire subscribed capital, and Clark
W. Upton, the plaintiff, became the assignee. The District Court
then directed a call to be made for the eighty per cent. remaining
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unpaid of the capital stock. A call was accordingly made, and
payments having been neglected, the assignee brought this suit
against the defendant, averring that he was the holder of one hundred shares, of the par value of one hundred dollars each, and, as
such, responsible for the eighty per cent. unpaid. On the trial
evidence was given tending to show that one Hale was
the owner of a large amount of thestock of the compny, for
which -he held the company's certificates, and that he had, through
his brother, sold one hundred shares to the defendant, on which
twenty per cent. had been paid. The books of the company
had been destroyed in the great fire in Chicago in 1871, but
there was evidence tending to show that the defendant's name
was on the stock ledger, and that the defendant transferred,
or caused the stock bought from Hale to b'e transferred to himself on the books of the company. The district judge submitted to the.jury to find whether the defendant actually thus became
a stockholder, recognised as such on the books of the company,
instructing them that if he did he was liable for the eighty per cent.
unpaid as if he had been an original subscriber. A verdict and
judgment having been recovered by the plaintiff, the case was removed by writ of error to the Circuit Court, where the judgme.t
was affirmed, and the case came by writ of error to this -court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The leading assignment of error here is that the court
below erroneously ruled that an assignee of stock, or of a certificate of stock in an insurance company, is liable for future calls or
assessments without an agreement or promise to pay. This, however, is not a fair statement of what the court did rule. The court
instructed the jury, in effect, that the transferee of stock on the
books of an insurance company, on which only twenty per cent. of
its nominal value has been paid, is liable for calls for the unpaid
portion, made during his ownership, without proof of any express
promise by him to pay such calls. This instruction, we think, was
entirely correct. The capital stock of an insurance company, like
that of any other business corporation, is a trust fund for the protection of its creditors or those who deal with it. Neither the
stockholders nor their agents, the directors, can rightfully withhold
any portion of the stock from the reach of those who have lawful
claims against the company. And the stock thus held in trust is
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the whole stock, not merely that percentage of it which has been
called in and paid. This has been decided so often that it has become a familiar doctrine. But what is it worth if there is no legal
liability resting on the stockholders to p a y the unpaid portion of their
shares unless they have expressly promised to pay it ? Stockholders become such in several ways : either by original subscription,
or by assignment of prior holders, or by direct purchase from the
company. An express promise is almost unknown, except in the
case of an original subscription, and oftener than otherwise it is not
made in that. The subscriber merely agrees to take stock. He
does not expressly promise to pay for it. Practically, then, unless
the ownership of such stock carries with it the legal duty of paying
all legitimate calls made during the continuance of the ownership,
the fund held in trust for creditors is only that portion of each
share which was paid prior to the organization of the company, in
many cases not more than five per cent.; in the present only
twenty. Then the company commences business and incurs obligations, representing all the while to those who deal with it that
its capital is the amount of stock taken, when in truth the fund
which is held in trust for creditors is only that part of the stock
which has been actually paid in. This cannot be. If it is, very
many corporations make fraudulent representations daily to those
who give them credit. The Great Western Insurance Company
reported to the auditor of public accounts, as required by law, that
the amount of its capital stock outstanding (par value of shares
$100 each) was $1,188,000; that the amount of paid up capital
stock was $222,831.42, and that the amount of subscribed capital
for which the subscribers or holders were liable was $965,168.58.
This report was made on the 10th of January 1871. Thus those
who effected insurances with the company were assured that over
one million of dollars were held as a trust fund to secure the company's payment of their policies. But if the subscribers and holders of the shares are not liable for the more than eighty per cent.
unpaid, the representation was untrue. Persons assured have less
than one-fifth the security that was promised them. This is not
what the statutes authorizing the incorporation of the company
contemplated. The stock was required to be not less than a given
amount, though the company was authorized to commence business
when five per cent. of that amount was paid in. Why fix a mini-
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mum amount of stock if all of it was not intended to be a security
for those who obtained insurance? There is no conceivable reason
for such a requirement, unless it be either to provide for the creditors a capital sufficient for their security, or to secure the stockholders themselves against the consequences of an inadequate capital.
The plain object of the statute, therefore, would be defeated if there
is no liability of the stockholder to pay the full prescribed amount
of each share of his stock. With this plain object of the' legislature in view it must be assumed, after the verdict of the jury, the
defendant #oluntarily became a stockholder. Either he must have
designed to defeat the legislative intent, or he must have consenited
to carry it out. The former is not to be presumed. And if the
latter was the fact, coming as he did into privity with the company, there is a necessary implication that he undertook to complete the payment of all that was unpaid of the shares he held
whenever it should be demanded. To constitute a promise binding
in law, no form of words is necessary. An implied promise is
proved by circumstantial evidence-by proof of circumstances that
show the party intended to assume an obligation. A party may
assume an obligation by putting himself into a position which
requires the performance of duties.
What we have said thus far is applicable to the case of an original subscriber to the stock, and equally" to a transferee of the
stock who has become such by transfer on the books of the company. There are, it is true, decisions of highly respectable courts to
be found, in which it was held that even a subscriber to the capital
stock of an incorporated company is not personally liable for calls,
unless he has expressly profnised to pay them, or unless the act of
incorporation or some statute declares that he shall pay them.
Such was the decision of the Supreme Court of New York, reported
in 17 Barbour 567, the case of the Fort .Edwardand .drt Hliller
Plank-road Company v. Payne. A similar ruling was made

in The Kennebec and Portland Railroad Company v. Kendall,
31 Maine 470. A like ruling has also been made in Massachusetts. In most, if not all of these cases, it appehred that the law
authorizing the incorporation of the companies had provided a
remedy for non-payment of calls or assessments of the unpaid
portions of the stock taken. The company was authorized to declare
forfeited, or to sell the stock for default of the stockholder, and the
VOL. XXIV.-81
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law having given such a remedy, it was held to be exclusive of any
other. Yet in them all it was conceded that if the statute had
declared the calls or assessments should be paid, an action of
assumpsit might be maintained against the legal stockholder on a
promise to pay, implied only from the legislative intent. Surely
the legislative intent that the full value of the stock authorized
and required to be subscribed, in other words, the entire capital,
shall be in fact paid in when required, that it shall be real, and not
merely nominal, is plain enough when the authority to exist as a
corporation and to do business is given on condition that the capital subscribed shall not be less than a specified sum. A requisition
that the subscribed stock shall not be less than one million of dollars, would be idle if the subscribers need pay only a first instalment on their subscriptions, for example, five per cent. Manifestly
that would not be what the law intended, and if its intent was that
the whole capital might be called in, it is difficult to see why a
subscriber, knowing that intent and voluntarily becoming a subscriber, does not impliedly engage to pay in full for his shares,
wheii payment is required. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss
this question further, for it is settled by the judgment of this
court. In Upton, Assignee of The Great Western Insurance
Company v. Tribileock, decided at this term, we ruled that the
original holders of the stock are liable for the unpaid balances at
the suit of the assignee in bankruptcy, and that without any express promise to pay. The bankrupt corporation in that case was
the same as in this.
But if the law implies a promise by the original holders or
subscribers to pay the full par value, when it may be called, it
follows that an assignee of the stock, when lie has come into privity with the company, by having stock transferred to him on the
company's books, is equally liable. The same reasons exist for
implying a promise by him as exist for raising up a promise by his
assignor. And such is the law, as laid down by the text-writers
generally, and by many decisions of the courts: Bond v. The
Susquehanna Bridge, 6 lIar. & Johnson 128 ; Hall v. United
States Insurance Company, 5 Gill 484; Railroad Company v.
Boorman, 12 Conn. 530; Huddersfield Canal Co. v. Buckley, 7
Term 36. There are a very few cases, it must be admitted, in
which it has been held that the purchaser of stock, partially paid,
is not liable for calls made after his purchase. Those to which
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we have been referred are Canal Co. v. Sansom, 1 Binney 70,
where the question seems hardly to have been considered, the
claim upon the transferee having been abandoned; and Palmer v.
The Ridge Mining Company, 34 Penn. St. 288, which is rested
upon Sansom's Case, and upon the fact that by the charter the
company was authorized to forfeit the stock for non-payment of
calls. We are also referred to Seymour v. Sturgess, 26 New York.
134, the circumstances of which were very peculiar. In neither
of these cases was it brought to the attention of the court that the
stock was a trust fund held for the protection of creditors in the
first instance, a fund no part of which either the company, or its
stockholders, was at liberty to withhold. They do not, we think,
assert the doctrine which is generally accepted. In Angell &
Ames on Corporations, see. 534, it is said: "When an original
subscriber to the stock of an incorporated company, who is so
bound to pay the instalments on his subscription, from time to
time as they are called in by the company, transfers his stock to
another person, such other person is substituted not only to the
rights, but to the obligations of the original subscriber, and he is
bound to pay up the instalments called for after the transfer to
him. The liability to pay the instalments is shifted from the outgoing to the incoming shareholder. A privity is created between
the two by the assignments of the one and the acceptance of the
other, and also between them and the corporation, for it would be
absurd to say, upon general reasoning, that if the original subscribers have the power of assigning their shares, they should, after
disposing of them, be liable to the burdens which are thrown upon
the owners of the stock." So in Redfield on Railways, eh. 9, see.
vii., pl. 4, it is said the cases agree that whenever the name of the
vendee of shares is transferred to the register of shareholders, the
vendor is exonerated, and the vendee becomes liable for calls. We
think, therefore, the transferee of stock in an incorporated company
is liable for calls made after he has been accepted by the company as
a stockholder, and his name has been registered on the stock books
as a corporator; and being thus liable, there is in implied promise
that he will pay calls made while he continues the owner.
All the cases agree that creditors of a corporation may compel
payment of the stock subscribed, so far as it is necessary for the
satisfaction of the debts due by the company. This results from
the fact that the whole subscribed capital is a, trust fund for the
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payment of creditors when the companybecomes insolvent. From
this it is a legitimate deduction that the stock cannot be r'cleased,
that is, that the liabilities of the stockholders cannot be discharged
by the company, to the injury of creditors, without payment. The
fact, therefore, that in this case the certificate of stock taken by the
defendant below was marked " non-assessable" is of no importance.
The suit is brought by the assignee in bankruptcy, who represents
creditors, and, as against him, the company had no right to release
tme holders of the stock from the payment of the eighty per cent.
unpaid.
The second assignment of error and the third are in substance
that the court should not have admitted in evidence the order of
the District Court directing a call by the assignee of the unpaid
balance of the stock, and should not have ruled that the call made
under the order was effective to make the liability of the defendant
complete. That these assignments cannot be sustained was decided
in Carver v. Upton, a case before us at this term. Nothing more
need be said in reference to them.
The last assignment of anything that can be assignedfor error is
that the court charged the jury as follows: " The only question
is, was the defendant a stockholder of the company ? If the testimony satisfies you that the defendant purchased of -Hale one
hundred shares of this stock, and that it was transferred in the
books of the company, either by Webster, the defendant, or by
Hale, who sold the stock, or by the direction of either of them, then
the defendant is liable the same as if he had subscribed for the
stock." The objection urged against this is that a transfer on the
books directed by Hale, after the purchase by Webster, could not
affect the latter's liability. But if Webster became the purchaser,
it was his vendor's duty to make the transfer to him, where only
a legal transfer could be made, namely, on the books of the company, and the purchase was in itself authority to the vendor to
make the transfer. Still further it was Webster's duty to have
the legal transfer made to relieve the vendor from liability to future
calls. A court of equity will compel a transferee of stock to
record the transfer, and to pay all calls after the transfer: 3 De
Gex & Smale Ch. 310. If so it is clear that the vendor may
himself request the transfer to be made, and that when it is made
at his request, the buyer becomes responsible for subsequent calls.
This, however, does not interfere with the right of one who
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appears to be a stockholder on the books of a company to show
that his name appears on the books without right, and without his
authority.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
With regard to some of the questions
involved or touched upon in the above
opinion, in this country the decisions
have been byno means uniform, and as
the topic is of considerable interest it
may be well to review the course of the
law bearing upon some of the more salient points arising out of subscriptions
to the stock of corporations, the means
of enforcing the same, and the liability
of subscribers and stockholders.
I. Whether the mere subscription to
the stock of a corporation, or an agreement to take stock in the same, creates
a personal liability to pay for the stock
without an express promise tothat effect.
II. Whether, where a remedy by forfeiture or sale for non-payment of calls
is given to the company, by statute or
by-law, the company is confined to that
remedy.
In order to avoid repetition, these two
points may be treated together, as in
many cases we meet them in company,
and as in some of the cases the decision
of the first has been deemed by some
authorities to rest, to some extent at
least, upon tle existence of the power
of forfeiture.
In Massachusetts, the leading case is
The Andover 6- Medford Turnpike Co. v.
Gould, 6 Mass. 40(1809). The form of
subscription was as follows : "Whereas
the legislature has at the last session
granted leave for making a turnpike
road, * * * we, the subscribers, desirous of having the same completed as
soon as possible, agree to take the said
road, the number of shares set against
our names, and be proprietors thereof."
The act under which the company was
incorporated gave the right of forfeiting
the stock for non-payment of calls. It
did not in terms restrict the company to

that remedy. The defendant became
delinquent. The company, waiving the
forfeiture, brought assnmpsit for the
unpaid assessment. It was' held that
the contract did not amount to a promise
to pay for, but only to take shares, and
that the right to forfeit having been
given by the legislature, it excluded by
implication any other remedy; I'AnsoNs,
C. J., remarking: cBut itis a rule,
founded in sound reason, that when a
statute gives a new power, and at the
same time provides the means of executing it, those who claim the power
can execute it in no other way. When
we find a power in the plaintiffs to make
the assessments, they can enforce the
payment in the method directed by the
statute, and not otherwise, and that
method is by the sale of the delinquent's
o
shares."
This was followed by 77he iVew Bedford and Bridgewater Turnpike Co. v.
Adam% 8 Mass. 138 (1811), wherein
SEWALL and
the court (SLDGWICe,
PAn-xE, JJ.) said: "The general
principle upon which they [the cases]
all rest is, that whiere the party makes
4n express promise to pay the assessments he is answerable. Where, on
the other hand, one, by subscribing the
act of association, simply engages to
become proprietor of a certain number
of shares, without promising to pay
assessments, then the only remedy which
the corporation has is by sale of the
shares to raise the sum assessed on
them."
In The Franklin Glass Co. v. White,
14 Mass. 286 (1817), the act of incorporation permitted assessments and provided forfeitures. On the argument
there was a distinction attempted by
counsel between this and the foregoing
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cases, on the ground that tile case be- for a sessinent, lie is liable to no action
fore tte court was that of a corporation for tlem by virtue of his membership."
In Maine, in the case of The Kennebec
organized for private profit merely. The
court, however, overruled tlhe distincIortlhnd Railroad Co. v. Kendall, 31
J3
Ale. 470 (1850), the subscription was
tion, and held that there was no personal
liability of the defendant to tile corpora- simply for shares at $100 per share.
tion, thotgh, under the Massachusetts
Tie charter gave the power to ordain
law, in case of a deficiency of corport- and establish such by-laws ', as shall
lion a.,-ets, the stockholders were per- from time to time be deemed necessary
sonally liable to answer an execution and proper, &c. ; also, to make and colagainst the company.
lect such assissnuents on the shares of
The above cases have been considered the capital stock as may be deemed exby some, amongst others by tle late pedient, in such nanner as shall be preChief Justice RL FIEhDt (Redfield ott scribed by their by-laws." A by-law
"Railways, 49), a, re~ting upon the fact was 1,ased authorizing assessments and
that in them the shares were given no forfeiture fir non-payment, and one
par value, but were simlply made liable holding the delinquent personally liable.
to assessments, and a line of cases, of Sm:m-t , C. J., said: " When the
which Th Cabot 'S-l|'st Sprngfild
language of a charter or statute does
Bridgtje Co. v. Chopin, 6 Cu-h. 50, is an not in terms anuthorize tile corporation
example, gives suppor to this idea, and to make a call personally on a holder
viewed in this light these cases are per- of stock, or impose upon him a perhaps reconcilable with the current of
sonal obligation to pay, bnt authorizes a
authority elsewhere, but the court itself
collection by sale of the shares, the
does not seem to have rested on that construction in this and in most of tle
ground alone or principally in making other states has been that no personal
its decisions, as appears from the words obligation to pay was imposed."
of' P.%itso-is, C. J., in the first-menIt will be observed that in this, unlike
tioned case, in which the learned judge the Massachusetts cases, there was a
seems to import the rule of strict con- value affixed to the shares of stnck, and
struction of the criminal law into re- a consequent limitation of liability, so
medial civil legislation.
that this is an uncompromising stateIt is, however, admitted that a sub- ment and enforcement of the doctrine
scription afitords sufficient consideration
of the exclusive remedy by forfeiture.
for a promise to pay, wheit expressly
These, it is believed, with a case to
made, and that in that case the mere be hereafter noticed, are the principal
cases in which it has been held that a
existence of a right of forfeiture will
not deprive the company of the action special promise to pay for stock taken
of assunpsit : l'orc~ster Turnpoike Co. is necessary to render the subscriber, in
v. I 7liord, 5 Mass. 80; Taunton 'j the absence at least of a statutory enactSouth Boston Turpiqke Co. v. Whiting, ment, liable in assumpsit. The ease of
The Ilfartfd J- N(w
10 Mass. 331.
nlarch
Railo,td
In New Ilampshire, tile same doctrine Co. v. Ktnnedj, 12 Conn. 500 (18:38),
has obtained, having been amnounced in is a strong enunciation of time contrary
The lranklie (lass Co. v. Ahxa(hr, 2 doctrine. The charter of thmecompany
provided for a sale of stock in case of
Y. 11. 380 (1821), in which WOODnuaty, J., remarked : " It is well settled delinquency. The defendant subscribed
that when an act of incorporation gives and paid a portion of the price of tle
no express remedy against a member
stock ; the subscription-list contained
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no express promise to pay. On a failure to pay assessments, the company
waived the forfeiture and sued in assumpsit for the arrears. On the argument the Massachusetts and New Hampshire cases were brought to the notice
of the court. HUNTINGDON-, J., said:
11It is true, a promise to pay in precise
terms does not appear to have been made.
The defendant has not affixed his signature to an instrument which contains
the words I promise to pay, but he has
done an equivalent act. Ile has contracted with the plaintiffs to become a
member of their corporation, and to be
interested in their stock to the extent of
$100 for each share assigned him, if
that amount be required. * * * When,
therefore, the subscribers associated under the act and became stockholders to
effect this object, and which could be
accomplished only by the advance of
money in payment of the instalments,
it seems difficult to give any other
legal meaning to their act than that it
was equivalent to an express promise to
pay their respective proportions of the
capital when lawfully demanded. Such
a construction of their engagement harmonizes with the entire design of their
association, is in furtherance of its
object, does no injustice to the stockholders, and affords all the security,
which can reasonably be required by the
public or the creditors of the corporation, that the object will be consummated and the debts of the company
After noticing
faithfully discharged."
the Massachusetts cases, the learned
judge spoke of the absence in them of
an expressly given power to demand
payment of assessments, and of the discretion given to the companies to fix
the value of their stock, and continued :
" We are not sure, however, that the
highly respectable judicial tribunal which
decided these cases was governed by any
of the peculiar circumstances to which
we have referred, nor will we confidently

assert that the cases are not strongly
analogous to or are distinguishable from
the present ease. If the court are to be
understood as establishing and applying
to all statutes in no sense penal, the
position that, where a new power is
given by a statute which also prescribes
the mode of its execution, those who
claim the power can exercise it in no
other way, we feel constrained to say,
we cannot give to decisions founded on
such a poinion the force of law in this
state. * * * When a common-law remedy is not taken away by the statute
which prescribes a new one, the latter
is merely cumulative. A statute made
in the affirmative, without any negative
expressed or implied, does not take away
the common law: Co. Litt. 115.',
This case was followed by llMard v.
Griswoldvillc JIfammf. Co., 16 Conn. 593
(1844), in which 'WArTE, J., said:
"What obligation did a stockholder
assume upon himself when lie subscribed
for a share of the stock of this company? The answer obviously is thaat
he agreed to pay the sum of $100 in
such instalments, and at such time, as
shall be required by the directors."
In New York, the earliest case in which
the question of the remedy where a forfe:,ure is permitted by statute arose, is
J.n1-ins v. Union Turnpike Co., 1 Caines
381, and 1 Caines Cas. in error 86,
(1804), wherein, though the case was
ultimately decided against the company
on another ground, LANsnG, Ch. J.,
said, "This is an affirmative statute. It
is a maxim of the common law that a
statute made in the affirmative without
any negative expressed or implied, doth
not take away the common law. Therefore, the plaintiff may either have his
remedy by the common law or upon the
statute."

L'IHoMmEDnEu, Senator, who

delivered the only other opinion, however, maintained the opposite, or as it
may be called, the Massachusetts doctrine.
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In Troy Turnpike and Railroad Co.
v. McChesney, 21 Wend. 296 (1839),
1\rLSON, Ch. J., said :" All the cases
from I Caines 3SI to 14 Johns. 238,
show that the condition of foribfiture of
stock and all previous stuns paid, for the
non-payment of any subsequent instalment, is but a cumulative remedy given
to the cotmpany. * * * It is trte the
forfeiture clause is earricd into the subsription papers. I cannot think that
this circumstance alters the ease
In The lurl Edhcard and l',r't .1illcr
.
PhOll-ro-ul Co. v. I)aym, 17 Barb. 569
(1854), the main quetion as to the effect of a .stock subscription per sec was
considered, IL..xs, P. J., saving " I
think the princide to he deduced from
the decisions is that if the act of incorporation or any public statute declares
the subscription to the stock or tle proprietor of the shares shall pay calls
made thereupon, or if he agrees to. do
so, whether in the articles of association
or other legal instrument, he is personally liable, even although the corporation has power to forfeit his stock for
noh-payment. * * * But where there
is a right of forfeiture given, either by
the act of corporation or by the terms
of the sul'scription, but no absolute duty
to pay is imposed by statute, and there
is no promise to pay, neither tle subscriber to the stock notr the shareholder
is personally liable to the corporation
for calls."
lle then raised an implied
promise from a prior article of association. This ca-e was reversed, 1 N.
Y. 583, on another ground, hat no opinion was given by the Court of Appeals
on the position taken by the court below on tie subject of the subscription
but in Th
,
nlhl,o and _,u1 341,rk failway Ca. v. Dadhy 14 N.Y. 336 (1856),
the que.tion was fairly met by the Court
of Appeal., T. A. Jotxsox, J., deliveriug the opinion, saying : - I am of
opinion, therefore, that the agreement
which the defendant subscribed is only

an agreement to take the stock of the
corporation. But upon this undoubtedly
the law raises an undertaking to pay
the amount subscribed." It had been
previously so leld1 by a Supreme Court
in Rensa'.ller and lls.ahigton Plank-rorid
Co. v. ldz,.l, 21 Barb. 56 (1855) ; see
also Tray and Boston Railroad Co. v.
2Wtbat. is Barb. 297.
It is also held that while the remedies
of forfeiture and by action are cumulative, yet a resort to the former will bar
the latter, on the ground of a rescission
of the original contract between the
company and the subscriber: BqftJ . and
. 37. Railway Co. v. Dudcy, supra;
,S:nl v. Hrrkiuner Manqfacturing Co., 2
Con. 330, reversing 21 Wend. 273.
The first question does not seem to
have arisen fairly in Pennsylvania. In
the first case there on the subject of subscription-Delwatre Caal Co. v. Sitt-

.woin, 1 Binuney 70 (11803)-there was a
power of forfeiture given by statute and
a subseription paper headed as follows
:
We
promise to pay the sum
of $200 for every share of stock in tle
said company in such manner and proportions and at such times as shall be
determined by the president and managers," &c. This was held a saflicient
promie to hind the original subscriber ;
as to tle remely, it was leld that the forfeiture might be waived and suit brought
for instalments. YEArs, J., however,
S31TtH, J., concurring, intimated that

an express promise was necessary to hold
the subscriber, though an opinion on
that point was not called for in tile phase
assumed by the case. In AJe,.rinte Miininq Co. v. Lry, 4 P. F. Smith 229
(1867), STRONG, J., delivering the
opinion of the court, showed a decided
tendency to follow the case in 12 Conn.,
and his language would justify the syllabua. which is as follows : " By the act
of subscribing to the capital stock of an
incorporated association each associate
undertakes to raise his proportion of
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the capital as it may be called for by the
directors." In Fraazl Oil Co. v. .J'cCleary, 13 P. F. Smith319 (1869), however, Tnompsobr, Ch. J., remarks on
the foregoing case and reduces its effect
to that of a mere registration of the law
of Michigan, as expounded by the Supreme Court; the case having arisen under a Michigan charter, although the
language of Judge STRONG would seem
to take a broader rangc and to he a
species of precursor of his opinion in the
principal case. We may, therefore, say
that in Pennsylvania tile
question as to
the personal liability of an original subscriber without a special promise, is unsettled, but that the law is, that forfeiture, where given, is a merely cumulative
remedy and may be waived.
That forfeiture is a merely cumulative remedy is also held in Illinois:
Klein v. Alton and Sangamon Railroad
Co., 13 Ill. 514 (1851) ; Peoria and
Oquawirka Railroad Co. v. Elting, 17 Ill.
429 (1856) ; in Mississippi: Freeman
v. Winchster, 10 Sm. &M. 577 (1848);
in Michigan : Dexter and 11ason Plankroad Co.v. iIillerd, 3 Mich. 91 (1854).
In Michigan indeed the cases go even
further, and after a sale of the stock,
which sale has not brought enough to
cover tle arrears, allow.assumpsit to be
brought for the deficiency. See Carson
v. Arctic 3Mining Co., 5 Mich. 288, in
which a distinction is taken between a
sale and a forfeiture.
III. The liability of a transferree of
stock for calls, made after he has become a proprietor of stock.
Of course, in those states where an express promise to pay has been held necessary to hold the original subscriber,
in the absence of any duty imposed by
statute, or declared thereby to arise out
of the mere ownership of shares, afortiori the transferree cannot be held in the
absence of a promise to pay on his part:
Franklin Glass Co. v. Alaandar, supra,
is a fair statement of this view of the law.
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In Connecticut, in The "-arfordand
New Haven Railroad Co. v. Boorman,
12 Conn. 531 (1838), HUNTINGON,J.,
said: "The reasons for our decision,
subjecting the original subscribers to
personal liability, apply with equal force
to those who become stockholders by
purchase. The relation of stockholder
and company exists. A privitybetween
them is established."
In New York, 11inn v. Carrie, 2
Barb. 294 (1848), it is said: "If he
became a holder by a transfer to him of
the stock of an original subscriber, lie
at once adopted his contract an d became
substituted in his place, both as regards
his rights and liabilities."
In Maryland, Bend v. Susquehanna
Bridge and Banking Co., 5 lIar. & J.
128 (1823), the court said : "1The
charter authorizing transfers and declaring all ' who may become the actual
proprietors of shares in the capital stock,
either as subscribers for the same or as
the legal representatives, successors or
assignees of such subscribers,' to be a
body politic and corporate, necessarily
creates a privity and raises an assumpsit, on the part of such as choose to become stockholders by accepting transfers, to pay all such calls as may be
regularly made, on which an action will
properly lie."
This case follows very closely Lord
KENYON's opinion in Hudderjid Canal Co. v. Buckley, 7 T. R. 36 (1796),
wherein he said : "After the assignment
the assignees hold the shares on the
same conditions, and are subject to the
same rules and orders as the original
subscribers, and are to all intents and
purposes substituted in the place of tho
original subscribers."
In Pennsylvania, in Thle Canal Co. v.
Sansonz, supra, Y.AiEs, J., said: "The
shares the defendant holds as transferree stand on a different ground ; as to
them le has given no express promise to
pay, and the act,has made no other pro-
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vision than that the shares should be shares of the capital stock of a jointforfeited."
The case was followed in stock company, like other contracts of
Palmer v. RidrI,- Minq Co., 10 Casey
sale and purchase, is binling until per288 {1859), criticisel in Merrimtc Min- formed or released by tile concurring
iag Co. v. Lery, srqmt, hut recognised assent of the parties, and consequently
as binding authority in Franks Oil Co. a buyer of such stock cannot discharge
v. 3fc( "'ri, supra.
himself of his liability to pay for it by
In TIe .11 rrhnwc 1hng Co. v. Bag- a transfer of it to a third party, without
the consent of the company." Ilealso
ley, 14 Mich. 501 (1866), the court said:
1 There is no principle of law which held that the company could not arbitrarily withhold its assent, but only for
can eetablish any difference among
stockholders in the ditties which are cause. The verdict and judgment were
implied from that relation. The very for the company, which judgment was
essence of a corporation consists in its affirmed by the Supreme Court, though
corporate succeion, which, in stock
the judges differed on the grounds of
companies, is kept up by the suhtitu- aflirmance. WOODWARD, J., said: "On
tion of one owner for another in the the next question, whieh relates to the
proprietorship of shares."
right of the defendant to transfer his
The statement in Angel & Ames, stock so as to escape liability for the
seet. 534, quoted in the opinion, as to unpaid instalment, we are a divided
the shifting of the burlen from the out- bench; but a majority concur, though
going subcriber to the incoming stock- for different reasons, in holding him liaholder, so far as it relates to the relief
ble, notwithstanding the transfer he
of the former, is a little too broadly put, made. Two of us think that he had a
and is tnsuplorted hy some at least of
perfect legal right to assign on any
the authorities cited in the foot-n6te.
terms he pleased, but that unless it was
The Alisur! Iabt'ay Co. v. MAount, 5 done with the assent of the company, he
Scott N. 11. 127, and The West Phiht- remained liable for the unpaid portion
delphia (mnal C. v. Innis, 3 Whart.
of his subscription. One of our num198, were not actions against original ber is of opinion that if the assignment
subscrihcrs; while in Coi.!c v. Crmm1,l, had been boni fide it would have re25 Barb. 413, the hank had assented to leased him from further liability, but
the transfer. ltrjlhm v. Mead, 10 Al- that the record showing it was rimlafide
len 243, wouhl seem to go the length he remains liable." LEwis, C. J.,
of the text-hook statement, but the re- said: "Whether the transfer was fair
port contains no very full statement of
or fraudulent, whether with the consent
facts. Ott the other hand, there is anu- of the company or without it, whether
thority to the effect that iii order to pro- entered on the books or not, whether
tect it-ell, the corporation has a right the purchaser became liable for the instalnents unpaid or not, there is nothto rcfuse to release an original subscriber by the acceptance of a new stock- ing in the law or in the nature of the
holder, until the stock is fully paid up. transaction, which discharges the origiIn Ererlwrt v. The I'hild(ldj1iI 6. West nal subscriber from his express written
Chester Railroad o., 4 Casey 339 engagements to pay the money."
(1857), the company refused to permit
In a similar case, decided in time fall of
a transfer, and brought suit against the the same year, Pittsburgh&
, St(tbenville
subscriber for arrears after the attempted Railromrd Co. v. Clarke et al., 5 Casey
assignment. In the Cotrt of Common 146, in the court below, IIAts'To.x, 13.
Pleas, IIutNEs, 1'. J., charged- as fol- J., had rested upon the law as stated in
lows : "A contract for the purchase of
Angel & Ames, sect. 534, and left to
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the jury the question of bona fides only.
The jury found for the defendants. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision,
laying down the broad rule: "Until
the stock is fully paid up, the corporation has a right to refuse to receive new
members in place of the original adventurer." This case was recognised and
followed in Graft v. Pitsburgh4- Stubenville Railroad Co., 7 Casey 489
(1858).
IV. As to the right of creditors, or
officers representing them as an assignee
in bankruptcy or a receiver, to compel
the payment of unpaid subscriptions to
stock. It may be premised that it is
held that the insolvency of a company
is no ground for restraining the collection of unpaid subscriptions or calls:
T-e.t Chester 6- Philadelphia Railroad
Co. Y. Thomas, 2 Phila. 344 ; Dill v.
11abash Valley PRailroad Co., 21 Ill. 91,
where the court said : "The insolvency
of the company can constitute no ground
for restraining the collection of these
judgments [for calls]. Indeed it shows
the more urgent reason why they should
be collected. It is due to the creditors
of the company that it should make
available all its resources and faithfully
apply the proceeds to the payment of its
debts."
In Wood v. Dunmmer, 3 Mason 308
(1824), STORT, J., said: "It appears
to me very clear, upon general principles, as well as the legislative intent,
that the capital stock of banks is to be
deemed a pledge or a trust fund for the
payment of the debts contracted by the
bank."
Ward v. Griswoldville tManufacturinq
(7o., supra, was a bill filed by creditors
to compel the company to make a call
for unpaid subscriptions. The bill was
sustained, the court holding that the
discretion of the directors as to making
calls was "merely ncodal, relating to
the time and manner of making the
payments."
That a creditor can corn-

pel the payment of an unpaid subscription when the corporation is insolvent,
is held in lenry v. I-ermnllion 6. A.Wand
Ruilroard Co. and St'ckhohdcrs, 17 Ohio
187 (1848).
In Mann v. Pntz, 3 N. Y. 422
(1850), the doctrine of a trust fttnd
mentioned by Judge SToat, and so ably
urged in the principal case, was recognised. In ankins v. Elliott, 16 N. Y.
377 (1857), the right of action for arrears in calls and subscriptions is said
to rest with the receiver. Seyniour v.
Slurgess, 26 N. Y. 134 (1862), alluded
to in the opinion, was a case of somewhat peculiar character. It was an action brought by a bond creditor to
recover from a stockholder the amount
still due upon his shares, the corporation having failed to meet its obligations. In the original bonds there was
a special agreement, "the obligee and
his assigns are to look only for payment
of it to the corporation, and out of its
funds and property." The bonds were
not met and a new series was issued;secured by a trust of the corporation
funds and property. The by-laws gave
the directors power to make calls to the
par value, provided each call should be
made by at least five directors, and gave
the power of forfeiture. Thecertificates
expressly rendered the stock " subject
to a further payment of $35 perslare."
No call had been made. ALLES4 J.,
said: ' The most that could be implied
from a subscription to the capital stock,
or an acceptance of a certificate of stock,
would be a promise to pay upon the request of the promisee [the company],"
and held, that there must be a call made
by the five directors ; without such a
call "the defendant could not be made
liable to pay to the corporation, * * *
and if not to the corporation, then not
to any one standing in the place of the
corporation, either by assignment, succession or act and operation of law."
Later, the court seemed to rest its deci-
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sion on broader ground: " They became stockholders by paying the amount
fixed by law or agreed upon with the
corporation, and taking certificates of
stock with a clause in them stating the
further payments to which the stock
might be subjected by order of the directors, thus making the title of the
.purchaser or stockholder a conditional
title under the by-laws depending on
the payment of the future calls, but
leaving such payment optional with
them." The opinion then goes on to
compare the liability to pay to a lien
on the stock.
It will be seen that the court lost
sight of what seems to be the key of
the subject, viz. : That subscribed capital is a trust fund for the protection of

the creditors of the corporation, in
which view, while the fact that no call
had been made by the five directors
might be a valid defence in an action by
the company, yet a creditor would stand
on a ditferent footing, and in regard
to this case, which seems in conflict with
the authority of cases in its own state,
most lawyers would agree with Judge
STRO G that it does not "assert the
doctrine which is generally accepted,"
and at any rate there would seem to be
no doubt that an assignee in bankruptcy,
who not ony represents the creditors, but
possesses the powers of the corporation,
so far as necessary to render available
its assets, could collect the amount of
an unpaid sum due upon the company's
stock.

II. BUDD, JR.

Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.
WILLIAM II. GROGAN v.E.MA G. GARRISON.
Under section two of the Dower Act (1 S. & C. 516): an estate oonveyed as
as
jointure, to i a good legal or statutory bar to dower, must be such an estate,
take possesto certainty and kind, that the wife, on the death of her husband, may
sion of, and hold in severalty, and not in common with others.
could be assigned
If the estate so conveyed be such as that at common law dower
bar to dower,
legal
a
be
to
jointure,
the
case
such
by metes and bounds, then in
and ]ioli in severshould le an estate in severalty, so that the widow may enter
u) have her jointure assigned
alty, without being compelled to resort to an action
to her by metes and bounds.
part, or any other
An auteniuptial contract which conveys an undivided one-third
good statutory bar.
interest in coninion with others, in liet of dower, is not a
jointure depends on the
Whether such an estate will constitute a good equitable
is pleaded by way of
facts and circunistances of the case, ail when such contract
it depends, and not
which
upon
facts
the
(ower,
for
equitalile defence to an action
the lleaders conclusions from the facts, must le statei].
one-third of a lot of
The conveyance of an estate as jointure, of an undivided
one-third of the husband's
land for the life of the wife, when sudi lot is less than
lands, is priad facie not a good equitable jointure, in the absence of facts showing
the widow as amount to an
that the same is fair and reasonable, or of such acts of
estoppel.
she survive her husband
The antenuptial covenant of a woman, that in case
by her for dower,
action
an
in
cannot,
she will not claim dower in his estate,
estoppel, where such anteoperate to bar such action, either by way of release or
bar.
nuptial contract does not constitute either a legal or equitable
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Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
The defendant in error, Emma G. Garrison, formerly Emma
Grogan, filed her petition for dower, stating therein that she was
the widow of one William Grogan, who, during coverture, was
seised of certain lands, out of uhich she asked an assignment of
her dower as provided by law.
William H. Grogan, a minor, and the only son of the deceased,
by a former marriage, and John Parker, administrator of William
Grogan, were made defendants.
William H. Grogan, by his guardian, filed an amended answer,
setting up as a bar to this action, an antenuptial contract, a copy
of which, by order of the court, was made part of the answer. It
conveyed to Mrs. Grogan a lot "for her jointure, and in full satisfaction of her whole dower."
To this the petitioner demurred, on the ground that said
amended answer did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
defence.
Upon the issue thus made, the case was reserved for hearing to
the general term, where it was held that the matters set up as a
bar were insufficient, and decreed that the petitioner was entitled
to dowe,.
This writ was brought to reverse that judgment.
Goodman &' Storer, for plaintiffs in error:I. The antenuptial contract is a good bar under the Dower Act,
section 2; 1 S. & C. 518, 519.
II. The contract under consideration is a good bar at common
law. For the definition and requisites for a good jointure, see
Coke's Littleton, ch. 19, 86 a. And as to whatLord CoKE meant
by "competent," see Washburn on Real Property 299; 1 Atkinson on Conveyancing 266; 1 Bright on Husband & Wife 434; 1
Roper on Husband & Wife 462; Scribner on Dower 381; Drury
v. Drury, 2 Eden 39 ; Id. 75 ; Walker v. Walker, 1 Yes. Sr. 54 ;
Tinney v. Tinney, 3 Atkyn 8; Caruthers v. Caruthers, 4 Bro.
Ch. 500; Smith v. Smith, 5 Yes. Jr. 189 ; Dyke v. Randall, 2
De Gex, MeN. & G. 209.
III. The contract is a bar at equity: Garttshore v. Chalie, 10
Ves. Jr. 1 ; Walker v. Walker, 1 Ves. Sr. 54 ; .Harveyv. Ashley,
3 Atkyn 3; Easteourt v. Eastcourt, 1 Cox 20; Tew v. Lord
Winterton, 3 Bro. Ch. 493 ; Simson v. Gutteiedge, 1 Mad. 609;
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Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79; AeArtee v. Teller, 2 Paige
511 ; Kennedy v. Mills, 13 Wend. 553; Gould.Ex'rs v. Womack,
2 Ala. 82 ; Stilhe v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 ; Murphy v. Murphy, 12
Ohio St. 407; P"hillips v. Phillips, 14 Id. 308.
In conclusion, we claim then.1. That the judgment of the Superior Court, as shown in their
reported opinion, was based upon mistakes of fact apparent on the
record.
2. That in every particular the antenuptial contract was in strict
conformity to the Act of 1824.
3. That not in England, any other of the United States, or in
Ohio, has hitherto any attempt been made to set aside such an
agreement made strictly in conformity to the statute of 27 Henry
VIII., and the similar acts of the various states.
4. That for the meaning of the word "jointure," as used in the
Act of 1824, we are remitted to the common law, and that there,
adequacy or amount is fiever to be considered in construing the
validity of a jointure.
5. That at equity an unbroken chain of decisions go to settle
the law to be, that antenuptial settlements are contracts, and that
a woman under no disability at the time is as much bound by her
contract, and estopped to deny its force, as a man could be.
L. -H.Swormstedt, for defendant in error:I. The antenuptial agreement and facts set up in the amended
answer are not sufficient to bar the defendant in error of her
dower in the estate of William Grogan, deceased, because it is not
a legal jointure within the letter and meaning of the statute: 1
S. & 0. 518. As this statute is similar to the provisions of 27
Henry VIII., chap. 10, relating to jointures, it is subject to the
constructions given that statute and similar statutes in other states,
and being in derogation of a common-law right, should be construed strictly. The statute itself contemplates that a case may
exist in which a conveyance can be made, and intended to be in
lieu of dower, and yet fail to operate as a legal bar: Sect. 4 of
the Dower Act. For a definition of "jointure," see Coke on Lit.,
sect. 41, note 8 ; 4 Kent, m. p. 56; Scribner on Dower 371, sect.
6; 1 Bright on Husband & Wife 435; 2 Scribner on Dower
884, sect. 32. The antenuptial agreement set up in bar of this
action, does not, as to its time of commencement, quantity or cer-
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tainty of the lands which the widow is to have, meet the requireinents of the law or statute: Thomas's Coke 597. In reference to
the matter of dowerment, ad ostium eeh'siw, see Thomas's Coke
464; 1 Scribner on Dower 73; 1 Washburn on Real Property
223, sects 4, 5, 7 ; 1 Bright on Husband & Wife 367, sect. 23 ; 1
S. & 0. 516.
II. The antenuptial agreement is no equitable bar: St/lly v.
Folger,14 Ohio 647 ; Murphy v. Hurphy, 12 Ohio St. 417; Wfvmack v. Womack, 2 Ala. 83; Tarbell v. Tarbell, 10 Allen 278.
III. The widow is not barred of her dower by the antenuptial
agreement, because the contract on its face is unfair and unreasonable, and there are no allegations in the amended answer to
show the contrary, the burden of proof being on the defendant
below: 2M"iller v. Xiller, 16 Ohio St. 532; Phillips v. Phillips,
14 Id. 315; 14 Ohio 647; IKline v. Kline, 57 Penna. St. 122;
64 Id. 122.
IV. This brings us to consider, whether or not the fact of the
defendant in error having been of age and having signed this antenuptial agreement, estops her from setting up a claim to dower.
To arrive at anything like a satisfactory conclusion on this point,
we must inquire what the widow's right of dower was when this
antenuptial agreement was entered into-what the widow's power
over it then was ? Among the essential elements of every contract, there must not only be parties competent to contract, but
subject-matter that has actual or potential existence for the contract to operate upon, and there must be mutuality. Viewed thus,
how does this antenuptial agreement stand ? What was the right
or subject-matter that the defendant in error released when she
signed the instrument set up in bar to her present action? Judge
SUTLIFF well expressed it in the case of Murphy v. lIuophy, 12
Ohio St. 416; Needles v. Needles, 7 Id. 432; 7 Mass. 155; 8
Shepley 364 ; Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Mass. 105 ; ,lhaw fT Wife v.
Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309; Sheldon v. Bliss, 8 New York 81; Blackmon v. Blackmon, 16 Ala. 633; 2 Scribner on Dower 384, sect.
32, cited above. Nor can the instrument operate as an estoppel
in pais, for, as a general principle of law, it is universally held that
an estoppel in pais will not operate unless the act done or thing
said was made in fraud or bad faith, and to the prejudice of the
party setting it up. .Both of these elements must exist together
Bigelow on Estoppel 473; 2 Scribner on Dower 384;
eKenzie
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v. Stcee et al., 18 Ohio St. 38 ; Morgqan et al. v. Spangler, 14Id.
102: B eardsley v. Fort, 14 Id.416; X eAfTerty et al. v. Conover's Lessee, 7 Id. 105; Lessee of Buickbighan v. Hanna, 2 Id.
551; K-nce v. I'nwe, 8 Shepley (Maine) 364. Applying these
principles of law to the present case, there is no foundation upon
which an estolpel in,pais can rest, for the very elements necessary
are wanting in this case." Can fraud or bad faith be imputed to
the defendant in error, because she permitted herself to be a party
to the antenuptial agreement and signed the same ? What legal
right or interest of William II. Grogan, who sets up this defence,
in his father's estate, has been interfered with or prejudiced, which
existed at the period when this antenuptial agreement was made?
The making of this antenuptial agreement was, and the attempt to
enforce it is, an endeavor to take from the widow a right given to
her by law, and which, from time immemorial, has been jealously
guarded and protected by the courts, for the purpose only of enlarging the interest of the heir. Is this what the law means by
the rights of others being prejudiced ? Certainly not; especially
when, as in 4 Ohio 495, the court say: "Estoppels are not favored
by courts of law, and less by courts of chancery."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JoiHsoN, J.-By the record, it appears that the case came on
for hearing at the general term, on the petition, amended answer,
and demurrer thereto, upon the questions presented by the
pleadings.
The court, without directly passing on the demurrer, virtually
does so by special findings of the truth of the facts stated in the
petition ; also that the defendant is in possession of the premises
described in the petition, claiming the estate of the plaintiff therein,
and that the plaintiff had notified him of her claim, and requested
that her dower be assigned, which he refused to do. It is then
adjudged that she be endowed of one equal third part of the lands
in the petition described. The court then proceeds to find that as,
by certain proceedings in the Probate Court of said county, the
plaintiff's dower interest in said premises "has been set off in
dollars and cents, all proceedings therefore to set off the same by
metes and bounds, by virtue of any order of this court, is waived
by the parties thereto." Upon this finding, it is ordered "that
the plaintiff receive her dower in money, as set off to her in said

GROGAN v. GARRISON.

Probate Court, and that defendant pay the costs," &c. No mention is made of the demurrer; but the findings and judgment that
she was entitled to dower was, in effect, sustaining it. It is a
little difficult to understand these two orders-the one that she
is entitled to dower in. one equal third part of the premises, and
the other that the land had been sold in another court, and dower
in money already assigned; in which last proceeding she had
waived her right to the relief sought in this action. Assuming,
however, that the record is defective upon this point, we proceed
to an examination of the errors complained of.
The errors assigned are:1. The court erred in holding that the amended answer did not
constitute a statuto;] jointure in bar.
2. In holding said answer did not amount to an equitable bar.
3. In holding that the petitioner was not estopped by reason of
the facts stated in said answer.
4. In holding that the burden of proof was on the defendant to
show that said antenuptial contract was reasonable.
As to this last assignment, it is sufficient to say that there is
nothing of record to show that the court did so hold. The demurrer
having been virtuiflly sustained, though not formally, there re.
mained no defence to the action. The defendant being a minor,
it became the duty of the court to be satisfied of the truth of the
petition, before rendering a judgment. The record shows the facts
specially found, but no such holding as is complained of appears.
The remaining errors assigned make it necessary to give a full
synopsis cf the defence. The amended answer, with the antenuptial contract which it sets up, states that previous to February 23d
1867, there was a treaty between the, plaintiff and said William
Grogan, concerning marriage between them; that she was of full
age, and under no restraint; that he was many years her senior,
and of feeble health, and was the owner of the premises described
in the petition, and a small amount of personalty; that he had one
child, the defendant, by a former wife; and that the terms of an
adjustment of the rights of the plaintiff, in the event of their
marriage and her survivorship, were freely discussed and agreed on.
He agreed to enter into said marriage only on the condition
that she would bind herself to accept, in the event of his deathan event then anticipated as not, likely, very remote-a certain
VOL. XXIV.-83
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interest in his estate, in full satisfaction of her claims as his
widow ; and on the 23d of February 1867, she freely and voluntarily entered into a written agreement to that effect, which was
duly executed and acknowledged by both parties, whereby it was
stipulated that said Grogan, in consideration of said marriage
about to take place with plaintiff, whose name was then Emma
Mitchell, did thereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to her,
during her natural life, real estate in Cincinnati, described as
follows :"All that lot of land, situate in said city, and being the one
undivided one-third part of the southwest part of lot No. ten [10],
in Ewing's subdivision, fronting ten [10] feet on Fifth street, and
running ack on Kilgour street, on lines parallel with said street
last named, one hundred and sixteen feet, nine inches [1161- feet],
said lot hereby conveyed being part of ground purchased by said
city for the purpose of extending Kilgour street."
It is averred
that this land so conveyed was in full satisfaction of her dower.
The parties were married February 24th 1867, and he died in August thereafter.
The answer concludes: "Wherefore, he denies that said petitioner is entitled to dower, as claimed in the petition, and asserts
that adequate provision was made for her by the aforesaid jointure,
and prays that her claim may be restricted to the premises set
forth in the contract."
The prayer that her claim, which was to have dower in this ten
feet as well as in the twenty-five feet in lot No. 9 adjoining, be
restricted to the premises just described-that is, to the ten feetwould seem to imply that the pleader understood this contract as
embracing a life-estate in the undivided one-third of ten feet front
by one hundred and sixteen feet deep, though, in argument, it is
insisted that this description embraced all of the ten feet front, and
not an undivided one-third. We do not so understand it.
The
will of deceased is printed as part of the record. There is no statement of facts showing the extent and value of William Grogan's
property at the date of the marriage, nor the value of the part
conveyed, nor of that remaining, to enable the court to say whether
it was adequate or not. There is no averment that the deed was ever
delivered to her, or that she, either during or after coverture, ever
had possession; on the contrary, the court finds, as one of the
reasons doubtless for sustaining the demurrer, that the premises
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are in the possession of the defendant; and still more, that, by
proceedings in the Probate Court, instituted, as they must have
been, by the defendants, or one of them, the property had been
sold and converted into money. We mention this as accounting for
the absence of such important averments in this defence. Grogan
died in-August 1867, and this petition was filed in 1870, and the
presumption is that, during the interval, this real estate, now set
up as a jointure, was held and controlled by the heir, and, for
aught that appears, she declined to accept the provision thus made.
Was she bound to accept it? The petitioner declined to take
under the will. The will refers to this antenuptial contract, and
declares that "she shall not have any dower in my real estate
described in the contract; * * * that is to say, that said Emma
Grogan shall have no dower in the real estate mentioned and
described in said contract."
Let us inquire:
1. Was this antenuptial contract a legal bar to an action for
dower ? If it was, then this action was improperly brought. The
Statute of Ohio, on this subject, reads:
"1Sect. 2. If any estate shall be conveyed to a woman as jointure, in lieu of her dower, to take effect immediately after the death
of her husband, and to continue during her life, such conveyance
shall bar her right of dower.
"Sect. 4. That when any conveyance, intended to be in lieu
of dower, shall, through any defect,.fail to be a legal bar thereto,
and the widow, availing herself of such defects, shall demand her
doweri the estate and interest conveyed to such widow with intention to bar her dower, shall thereupon cease and determine."
What, then, is a jointure, under this statute-? It is a word having a fixed legal signification, long prior to the enactment of our'
dower act. The section quoted is, in fact, but the adoption of a similar provision, found in stat. 27 Henry VIII, c. 1056, which enacted
that where lands are settled to the use of the-wife, "that then, in
every such case, every woman having such jointure * * * shall
not have title to any dower in the residue." This Act of Parliament was enacted to prevent a woman from having both dower and
jointure. Before its passage, accepting a jointure was not a bar
to her action for dower.
Under this statute, the word jointure had as definite and welldefined legal meaning as.any other legal term. It was an estat4
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made to the wife in satisfaction of dower. Sir EDWARD COKE says,
" that to the making of a perfect jointure, within that statute, six
things are to be observed:
"1. It is to take effect for her life, in possession or profit, presently after the death of her husband.
" 2. It must be for her own life, or for a greater estate.
"3. It must be made to herself, and to no other for her.
"4. It must be made in satisfaction of her whole dower, and not
of part of her dower.
"5. It must be expressed or averred to be in satisfaction of her
dower.
"6. It may be made either before or after marriage."
He adds: " So as to comprehend all iii a few words : ajointure
* * * is a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands
or tenements, to take effect presently in possession or profit after
decease of the husband; now, as dower ad ostium ecclesiw, or cx
assensit yatris, is better for the wife, because, in respect to certainty, she may enter, than dower at common law where she is
driven to her action, and therefore Britton calleth dower ad ostium
eclesi and ex assensu patris, establishment of dower by the husband, and assignment of dower after his decease (for nothing that
is uncertain is established); so jointure (that hath the force of a
bar or dower by said Act of 27 Henry VIII.), is, as hath been
said, more secure and safe for the wife than dower ad ostium
ecclesice or ex assensit 2atris, for besides it is as certain as these
others she may enter into it, after the death of her husband, and
not be driven to her action:" Coke on Lit., sect. 41, note 8.
A jointure with all these qualities is binding on the widow, and
a complete bar to her claim : 1 Cruise Digest, title 9, chap. 1, sect.
19. But it had to be as certain as dower ad ostium eceesice or ex
assensu patris,and to be better than these; and, as Coke says,
more secure and safe for the wife than either of these, or than
dower at common law. It bad to be established, so the wife could
enter, after the death of her husband, and not be driven to her
action. It is said jointure is to be as certain as dower ad ostium
ecelesie or ex assensu patris. How certain were they ? Coke
says: " Dowment ad ostium ecelesice is where a man of full age,
seised in fee-simple, who shall be married to a woman, and when
he cometh to the church-door to be married, then after affiance and
troth plighted between them, he endoweth the woman of his whole
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land or the half or other lesser part thereof, and then openly doth
declare the quantity and the certainty of the land which sle shall
have for her dower. Here be two things that the law doth delight
in, viz. : To have this and the like openly done; second, to have
certainty, which is the mother of quiet and repose, and this word
(moiety), above said to be intended of the half in certainty, and
not of the moiety in common, which clearly appeareth in that here
Littleton saith the quantity/ and certainty of the land :" Coke on
Lit., title Dower, sect. 89.
So dower ex assensu patris must have the same quality of certainty. It must be "of parcels of his father's lands or tenements
with the assent of his father, who after assigns the quantity and
parcels. In this case, after death of the son, the wife shall enter
into the same parcel, without the assignment of any: Coke Lit.,
title Dower, sect 40. Jointure was as certain as dower ad ostium
echesie or ex assensu patris. It was more secure and safe than
either of these. It was, like them, an establishment of dower
by the husband, and better than either of these, she might enter
into it, after the death of her husband, and not be driven to her
action. This was doubtless for the reason that it was evidenced
by a conveyance in writing. In T1ernon's 0ase, 4 Coke 1, the
leading one on the subject, it is said, "that dower ad ostium
ecclesice and ex assensu patr8 concluded the wife of her dower, if
she entered into the land so assigned to her, after the death of her
husband, for these being in such form as the law requires to be
dowers in law, an assignment of dower, when the husband was
sole seised, cannot be made of the third or fourth part in common,
but oughrt to be in severalty." 1 Thomas's Coke 597.
At common law it was imperative as a requisite of dower that
the husband should be sole seised. Upon estates held in joint
tenancy no dower would attach: Lit., sect. 45; 1 Scribner on
Dower 257. So stringent was this rule, that where one joint tenant aliened his share, destroying the possibility of survivorship
and severing the tenancy, the widow of the alienor could not claim
dower : 4 Kent 37 ; Coke Lit., sect 31 6. The reason for this rule
is obvious, and applies with equal force to a joihture. The sole
seisin of the husband was indispensable, because only in such case
could dower be assigned by metes and bounds, and as jointure was
in lieu of dower, the same qualities as to the estate granted necessarily existed. It must be so assigned as to be held in severalty
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* without an action at law. By the terms of our statute jointure
must be an estate, conveyed as jointure. If from any defect it
fail to be a legal bar t6 dower, and the widow elects to take advantage of this defect, and demands her dower, the estate conveyed
as jointure shall cease and determine. In what sense, then, is this
-wordjointure used ? It was a term which, for more than two hundred years, had had a fixed legal signification. Long prior to the
adoption of the Act of 27 Henry VIII. jointures were in common
use, and their meaning well understood. That statute, from which
ours is almost literally borrowed, has been carefully considered in
many reported cases by the most profound jurists of England. The
repeated discussions, and the long line of decisions, growing out
of this act, and similar ones in most of the states of the union,
-were doubtless familiar to our ancestors, who incorporated a like
provision in the statutes of Ohio. They were men well versed in
the common law, and especially that part relating to real estate.
It is well established as a rule of interpretation, that where particular words or phrases have in law an acquired, fixed legal
signification, and are thus incorporated into a statute, the legal
presumption is that the legislature meant to use them in this legal
sense: Turney v. Yeoman, 14 Ohio 207. Where a statute speaks
of a deed, it must be taken in its technical sense, as understood at
common law-that is, a writing sealed and delivered by the parties: Moore's Lessee v. Trance, 1 Ohio 10. So, also, where the
word mortgage is used, it will be assumed that it is used in its
ordinary legal signification, as well understood at common law,
and that the legal liabilities incident to it were understood to follow. Per SCOTT, J., 111edical College v. Zeigler, 17 Ohio St. 52.
Guided by this rule of interpretation, and by the light of the
authorities and decisions referred to, we are led to conclude that
the estate to be conveyed as jointure must possess those prime
requisites enumerated by

L1TTLETON

and

COKE,

which we have

quoted-that there must be such an estate as the widow can enjoy
in severalty. It must declare the " quantity and certainty" of the
lands she shall have-the "two things that the law doth delight
in"-&frst, to have it done under our statute, by a solemn deed of
conveyance; and, second, to have "in certainty, which is the
mother of quiet and repose." And Lord COKE adds, speaking of
certainty in dower at the church-door, and commenting on LITTLE-
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TON'S text : "" This word moiety means a half in certainty, not of

moiety in common."
In MVinch's Cases, p. 33 (London, 1657), it is said, to be a good
jointure, a wife must have a sole estate, after the death of her husband. In the case at bar, the conveyance is fatally defective in
this prime quality of certainty. It conveys an undivided one-third
for. life. The widow can not enter and enjoy in severalty ; she
would be driven to her action at law to have it assigned and set
apart to her. One of the prime reasons for making a jointure was
to give the wife the right, without her action, to enter and be sole
possessor. Again, to constitute a good conveyance of an estate,
the deed must not only be duly executed, but it must be delivered.
We therefore hold that this antenuptial contract, for the reasons
stated, is not a good statutory bar.
I. The next inquiry is, was it good as an equitable jointure ?
What constitutes an equitable bar is a question fruitful in decisions.
Much learning and many conflicting decisions can be found in the
books. The substance of all the decided cases is that any provision
made before marriage, whether of lands and tenements, goods and
chattels, or whatever description of property, that constitutes a
valuable consideration, if fair, reasonable, and just, as between the
parties, in view ol all the circumstances of the case, at the time the
contract was made, will, in equity, be supported as a good equitable jointure: Miller's Ex'r v. Miller, 16 Ohio St. 532 ; 2 Scrib.
on Dower 385-401. Each case must be determined on its own
particular facts and equities. Looking at all the facts disclosed
by this answer, and the absence of averments, we have arrived at
the conclusion that this contract is not, in equity, a bar. It conveys less than one-tenth of the real estate; no value is stated; it
was only for life, in less than one-third of the whole; nothing was
ever done to put her in possession ; no acceptance by her, or part
performance ; and no facts stated to show that it was fair, reasonable, or just to her. It has been an axiom, accepted for ages, that
dower was to be favored; that no widow should be barred of that
ancient and cherished right, unless1. There was settled upon her, in strict conformity to law, an
estate, as jointure, possessing all those requisites already pointed
out; or,

2. There were such adequate provisions made, in lieu of dower,
as, under all circumstances, was fair, reasonable, and just.
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Neither do we think the petitioner
III. As to estoppel.
estopped. She has done no act during or since coverture, that
amounts to an estoppel. Her antenuptial covenant to accept this
conveyance in lieu of dower cannot have the effect to release her
dower. In the case of Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 155, the
court says: '"This leads us to the second ground, viz., that the
defendant's covenant ought to have the effect of a release of dower.
But this effect cannot be admitted on any correct legal principle.
It is true that a covenant never to prosecute an existing demand
shall operate as a release to avoid circuity of action. But a release of a future demand not then in existence is void. Now in
this case, the settlementbeing executed before marriage, the demand
In the
of dower had no existence, the same being inchoate."
case of Trance v. Trance, 8 Shepley (Maine) 364, the court say:
" There can be no estoppel by executory covenants not to claim a
right which is first to accrue afterward. The covenants of the
wife with the husband before marriage, that she will not claim
dower in his estate can not operate by way of release, estoppel, or
rebutter to bar her of her dower."
The judgment of the Superior Court is therefore affirmed.
SCOTT,

Chief Judge, DAY,

WHITMAN

and WRIGHT, JJ., con-

curred.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
MICHAEL IANNON

ET AL. v.

THE COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS

FT AL.

Tie rule that counties, being political sub-divisions of the state, are not liable
for the laches or misconduct of their servants, has no application to a neglect of
those obligations incurred by counties when special duties are assumed or imposed
on them.
Thus, where the county of St. Louis made a contract for laying water-pipe to
the county insane asylum, the work being done under the supervision of the county
engineer, and while a trench was being dug in the grounds of the asylum, it caved
in and killed one of the workmen, it was held that the duty in vlich the county
was engaged, was not one imposed by general law upon all counties, but a selfimposed one ; that quoud hoc the county was a private corporation, engaged in a
private enterprise (more especially as the work was being done on its own property), and governed bythe same rules as to its liability. In such case it isimmaterial, whether the performance of the work is voluntarily assumed in the first
instance, or is a special duty imposed by the legislature, and assented to by the
county.
And municipal and quasi corporations are, under the above circumstances, subject
to the same doctrine of liability.
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ERROR to St. Louis Circuit Court.

The petition alleged that in September 1872, the county of St.
Louis entered into a written contract with Henry Luken, whereby
the latter agreed to lay a water pipe from the main pipe, at the
intersection of Lafayette and Grand avenues, along certain streets
to the grounds of the County Insane Asylum, thence through those
grounds to a connection with the cistern of the asylum, in order to
supply the same with water ; that the work was to be done to the
satisfaction of the county engineer; was to be superintended by
him, and that such precautions should be taken in the progress of
the work, and in shoring such trenches as might be dug, in order
to prevent accidents to life and limb, as the engineer should direct;
that the width of the trench for the reception of the pipe was to be
two and a half feet, and to vary in depth with the grade of the
street; that the sides of the trench were to be shored with plank
and timber; that the county reserved to itself the superintending
control over the work, and the right to discharge any workman the
contractor might employ; that in December 1872, the contractor
had, in pursuance of the work, and under the direction of the
engineer, dug on the grounds of the County Insane Asylum, then
owned by the county, a trench thirty feet in depth, and not exceeding two and a half feet at the bottom; that by reason of this
and of not being properly shored, the trench was dangerous, and
known to be so by both the engineer and,the contractor; that the
minor son of plaintiff, Patrick Iannon, was in the employ of the
contractor, engaged in laying the pipe along the bottom of the
ditch, and, while the engineer was present, superintending and
directing the work, the sides of the trench,. without any fault -or
negligence on the part of Patrick Hannon, in consequence of the
wrongful act, neglect and default of the engineer and of the contractor, in failing to properly shore the sides thereof, caved in and
suffocated the son of plaintiff, &c.
A demurrer to this petition, on the ground that the " countT is
a political sub-division of the state of Missouri, and not a body corporate, either private or municipal, liable for the laches or misconduct of its servants or employees," was sustained by the Circuit
Court.
Balewe&l Parish, for plaintiffs in error.-The case at bar is
one in which the county was acting in a private capacity and was
VOL. XXIV.-84
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liable to the extent to which a private corporation would be: Lloyd
v. Mayor of New York, 5 Seld. (N. Y.) 869; Eastman v. Meredithi, 86 N. H. 292; Bayley v. .1ayor of New York, 8 Hill 589;
Mears v. Con. of Wilmington, 9 Ired. 78; Inhabitants _Pourth
School District of Rumford v. Vood, 13 Mass. 198; Thayer v.
Boston, 19 Pick. 511; Akron v. 1. County, 18 Ohio 229;
Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Id. 159 ; Cunliffe v. Mayor of Albany,
2 Barb. 190; Larkin v. County of Saginaw, 11 Mich. 91; Kent's
Com., vol. 2, p. 875; United States Bank v. Planters' Bank, 9
Wheat. 907; Conradv. Village of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 172; Ilickok
v. Plattsburg, 16 Id. 161. In this case it is to be borne in mind
that the party injured was working under the immed4ate direction
and superintendence of a county officer: Dillon Mun. Corp.,
§ 792, and cases cited.
Thomas C. Reynolds, County Attorney, for defendants in error,
relied on Reardon v. St. Louis County, 86 Mo. 555 ; and referred
to Dillon Mun. Corp., 2d ed. 1878, p. 872.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, J.-The case, as made by the pleadings, concedes
the validity of the contract mentioned in the petition, and consequently that point is not open to discussion.
In the view we have taken of this case, it would be foreign, alike
to our purposes and the facts admitted by the demurrer, to question the correctness of the proposition so generally concurred in
elsewhere, asserted in Reardon v. St. Louis County, 86 'Mo. 555,
"that quasi corporations, created by the legislature for the purposes of public policy, are not responsible for the neglect of duties
enjoined on them, unless the action is given by the statute."
But as Mr. Justice METCALF, in Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray
541, when speaking of the rule established in Mower v. Leester, 9 lass. 247. that a private action cannot be maintained
against a quasi corporation for neglect of corporate duty, unless
the action be given by the statute, very appropriately remarks:
"This rifle of law, however, is of limited application. It is applied
in the cases of towns only, to the neglect or omission of a town to
perform those duties which are imposed on all towns without their
corporate assent, and not to the neglect of those obligations which
a town incurs when a special duty is imposed on it with its consent,
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express or implied, or a special authority is conferred on it at its
request. In the latter case a town is subject to the same liabilities for the neglect of those special duties to which private corporations would be if the same duties were imposed, or the same
authority conferred on them, including their liability for the
wrongful neglect, as well as the wrongful acts, of their officers and
agents."
Towns in New England, as mentioned
in the above extract,
occupy the same place as counties, for, in Eastman v. Hferedith,
36 N. I. 292, PERLEY, C .J., when referring to the former, says:
"Towns are involuntary territorial and political divisions of the
state, like counties established for purposes of government and
municipal regulation." A similar definition is given of counties.
Dillon Mun. Corp., vol. 1, § 10 a.
In the case at bar, the county of St. Louis was not engaged in
the discharge of duties imposed alike by general law on all counties; duties whose performance, if neglected, might have been
enforced by appropriate precedure for that purpose; but in the
discharge of a self-imposed duty not enjoined by any law. And
the test of the matter is this : that the county could not have
been compelled to enter on the work for whose performance it
contracted.
If the doctrine asserted in Bigelow v. Randolph, supra, be the
correct one, and it has received the approval of Mr. Justice DILLON,
in his work on Corporations (vol. 2, § 762); and if, as before
stated, the county undertook the contract of its own volition, and
not in the observance of a public duty imposed by general law,
then there is no refuge from this result : that the county, in regard
to the performance of that contract, must occupy the same attitude
as if a mere private corporation, and the work thus contracted for
should be deemed a private enterprise, undertaken for its own local
benefit; and this is more especially the case as the work, at the
time of the occurrence which resulted in this action, was being
done on its own property. And it certainly can make no difference, in point of principle, whether the "special duty is imposed
with its consent, express or implied," or whether, as in the present
case, it voluntarily assumed the performance of that which, if imposed by the legislature, and assented to by the county, would
have become a special duty. For it is the element of consent
which attaches civil liability, with its attendant consequences, to
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the act done. In other words, as certain results flow from the
acceptance by a quasi corporation of a special duty or a special
authority, it is therefore the exercise alone of that volition which
fixes its liability. Consequently, it must become quite immaterial
whether the thing done, from which civil liability ensues, originates
in the free act of the county in the first place, or whether it is
legislative permission and its subsequent acceptance by the county,
which gives origin to the act whose negligent performance produces
the injury complained of.
Bailey v. The Mayor, sfc., of the City of New York, 3 Hill
531, was a suit brought to recover damages against the city for an
injury to plaintiff's land in Westchester county, occasioned by the
breaking away of a dam across -Croton river, which dam, as well
as the lands on which it was situated, was owned by the city.
It was alleged that the dam, which had been erected by certain
'water commissioners appointed by the state, for the purpose of
introducing pure water into the city, was unskilfully built. The
plan for the work had been, under the Act of the Legislature,
submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection. It was
approved; and the enterprise, which included the building of the
dam, was then in pursuance of the act, under the direction of the
common council, prosecuted by the legislative commissioners at the
expense of the city. The *citywas held liable ; and these were the
grounds on which Chief Justice NELSON, in a very able and exhaustive opinion, in which many authorities were cited and discussed, held the liability to be based: 1. That the legislative
grant was for the purpose of private advantage and emolument,
though the public might derive a common benefit therefrom ; the
corporation quoad hoe was to be regarded as a private company.
2. "By accepting the charter, the defendants thereby adopted the
commissioners as their own agents to carry on the work; the
acceptance was entirely voluntary, for the state could not enforce
the grant upon the defendants against their will." 3. A municipal
corporation, in its private character as the owner of land and
houses, is to be regarded in the same light as an individual, and
dealt wifh accordingly.
The case finally went to the court for the correction of errors,
where the judgment was affirmed: 2 Den. 433. There was some
diversity of opinion in that court, as to the ground on which the
affirmance should be placed, nineteen members of that court voting
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therefor, against four for reversal;,but only five of the number
gave expression to their views in writing. The president of the
senate gave an opinion for reversal. It may be very reasonably
supposed, however, that those voting for affirmance did so on the
same grounds as those stated in the opinion delivered. Senators
Barlow and Bockie were for affirmance on the second ground stated
by the Chief Justice, that the defendants had made the water commissioners their agents by adoption, but they did not question the
correctness of the other grounds relied on by the Supreme Court,
and in this view Senator Hand also concurred, as well as in the
other views taken by the Chief Justice. Chancellor WALWORTII
based his vote for affirmance on the third ground given by the
Chief Justice, though a careful perusal of his opinion will clearly
show a substantial accord between his views and those of the
Supreme Court, except as to the question of agency resulting from
adoption. The opinion in that case, having been so thoroughly
discussed and considered in two courts possessing appellate jurisdiction, is valuable as a precedent, and, notwithstanding subsequent
criticism (Darlinqtonv. Mlfayor, ,-c., of New York, 4 Tiff. 164),
has never been overruled: Lloyd v. ilfayor, &jc., of New York,
1 Seld. 369.
I am fully aware of the distinction so generally taken by the
authorities between the liability of municipal corporations on the
one hand, and the non-liability of quasi corporations under like
circumstances on the other, though it has been very shrewdly observed in this connection, that "the courts have been much perplexed respecting the principle on which to rest the distinction :"
Dill. Mun. Corp., § 764. But I think it may with safety be asserted,
that the admitted facts of this case disclose no sound reason why
any such distinction should be taken here, nor why the county, in
respect to its own property, should not be held amenable to the
same rules, as would certainly prevail were a municipal or private
corporation, or an individual, a party defendant. Such is evidently
the drift of the above cited cases, and such must be the evident
and inevitable result, if that reasoning be pushed to its natural and
logical conclusion.
Again, the legislature, by the Act approved February 8th 1870,
recognised the County Lunatic Asylum as an existing fact, and
provided that the county court might commit the insane of that
county to the county institution: Laws App. to St. Louis Co., p.

IN RE MOSNESS.

202. The legislature also, by an act approved April 1st 1872
(Id. 203), before the contract or work mentioned in the petition
was made or entered upon, recited the fact that the asylum was
built at the expense of the county, and appropriated $15,000 annually in support of "the humane objects contemplated by its
establishment," thus giving the whole matter legislative sanction
and recognition. So that if it be urged that the argument is unsound which maintains that a self-imposed duty is tantamount to
a special duty imposed, or a special authority conferred by legislative act, the ready reply is, that the acts of the legislature referred to bring the case fully within the principle applied by Mr.
Justice METCALF, in Bigelow v. Bandolph, supra. °
This case is one of first impression in this state, and perhaps
elsewhere; and if it goes beyond adjudicated cases, it certainly
does not go beyond the principles which those cases enunciate.
Holding these views, the judgment should be reversed and the
cause remanded.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
IN RE MOSNESS.
Attorneys should be residents of the state in which they are licensed to practise.
They are officers of the court and the nature of their office implies that they shall
be residents and subject to the jurisdiction of the state and the court.
It is an insuperable objection to the general admission of any person to the bar
that he is a non-resident ; but as a matter of courtesy it is customary to permit nonresident lawyers to appear and conduct cases pro hac vice only.

MOTION for the admission to the bar of this court of Ole Mos-

ness, a member of the bar of the state of Illinois.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RYAN, 0. J.-It is, we believe, the general practice of courts
of record in the several states to permit gentlemen of the bar in
other states to appear as counsel, on the trial or argument of
causes. Such has been the uniform practice of this court. An~d,
under all ordinary circumstances, it will always be a pleasure to us
to permit members of the bar of other states to argue cauiss here,
whenever they may appear here to do so. No license to practise
here is necessary or proper for that purpose; the usual and proper
practice being to grant leave, ex gratia,for the occasion.
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But general license to practise here as attorney and counsellor
rests upon quite different considerations.
The bar is no unimportant part of the court, .and its members
are officers of the court: Thomas v. State, 22 Wis. 207 ; Cotteren
. (Jormaughton, 24 Id. 134; see Bacon's Abr., Attorney, I. ; 1
Tidd's Pr. 60; 3 Black 25; 1 Kent 306; Ex parte Garland,4
Wall. 333. And if officers of the court, certainly in some sense
officers of the state for which the court acts: Re Wood, Hopk. 6.
This is not really denied in 20 Johns. 492, decided in the same year.
And if it were, we have no doubt that the counsellors of a court,
though not properly public officers, are quasi officers of the state,
whose justice is administered by the court. The state may have
extra-territorial officers, as commissioners to take acknowledgments,
&c. But these are exceptions ; and the general business of the
state, within the state, executive, legislative and judicial, must be
performed by citizens or denizens of the state, and the officers
charged with it must be resident in the state : State v. Smith, 14
Wis. 497; State v. M1furray
1 , 28 Id. 96.
So the courts may have extra-territorial officers for extra-territorial functions, as commissioners to take depositions, &c. But
for all functions within the jurisdiction of the courts, their officers
must be residents of the state. This is essential to the nature of
the functions themselves, and to the proper control of courts over
their officers. The office of attorney and counsellor of the courts is
one of great official trust and responsibility in the administration
of justice; one liable to great abuse, and has always been exercised in all courts, proceeding according to the course of the common law, subject to strict oversight and summary power of the
court. It would be an anomaly, dangerous to the safe administration of justice, that the office should be filled by persons residing
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and practically not subject to
its authority. We take it that members of the bar of this state
lose their right to practise here by removing from the state. After
they become non-residents, they can appear in courts of this state
ex gratiaonly. Our courts cannot have a non-resident bar.
This all appears to us to be so very plain that it is difficult to
believe that chap. 50 of 1865 was intended to do more than to
authorize the appearance here, as counsel in the trial and argument of causes, of gentlemen of the bar of other states. If in-
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tended to do that it was probably unnecessary. If intended to do
more, it was clearly without the power of the legislature.
For the reason only that the gentleman whose admission is
moved is not a resident of the state, the motion must be denied.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
J. M. McARTIIUR v. A. C. GODDIN ET

AL.

The full faith and credit required to he given to records of judicial proceedings
in another state, means that such records shall have the same effect as records of
home proceedings of like nature.
a
In actions on such records, the Statute of Limitations of thestate where the actions
are brought must govern. That statute is a plea to tle remedy and therefore to he
governed by the ler.fori.
The statute of Kentucky bars any further proceeding on a judgment after fifteen
years from the last execution thereon. An action in Kentucky cannot he nmintained on an Ohio judgment upon which no execution had issued for more than
fifteen years. Nor does it make any difference that within fifteen years the Ohio
judgment has been revived in that state. Such revivor is simply a restoration of
a lien, not a new judigmient.

ERROR from Campbell Circuit Court.
In 1856, Brown, Goddin & Co. obtained a judgment in the
Superior Court of Cincinnati against the appellant, J. i. AMcArthur, for $3668,09. It was alleged in the original action that the
notes evidencing the indebtedness had been lost. At the time this
action was instituted and the judgment rendered, McArthur was a
resident of the state of Kentucky, and has continued to reside
here since. The service of process on him was acknowledged by
an attorney, and an answer filed by the same attorney admitting
the execution of the notes, that they were lost, and the indebtedness
of the defendant to the plaintiffs as alleged.
No execution having issued on this judgment, the appellees, A.
C. Goddin & Co., as surviving partners of Brown, Goddin & Co.,
on the 22d of September 1874, filed their petition in the court in
which this judgment had been rendered, alleging the recovery, that
the judgmient remained unsatisfied, and asking that an order reviving it be entered for the amount due thereon. A summons
having been executed on the appellant in this state, under the
provisions of the Ohio statute, he appeared and resisted the motion
to revive, alleging that lie had no knowledge of the original judgment, or the pendency of the action in which it was obtained, until
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he was served with process on the petition for revivor; that the
entry of his appearance and filing of the answer by the attorney
was without his authority or knowledge; denied any liability on
the notes, &c. On the trial in the proceeding to revive the judgment, testimony was introduced to sustain the defence of the appellant, and upon the hearing in June 1875, it was adjudged, "that
the judgment stand revived with interest and costs, and that the
plaintiffs have their execution against the defendant for the sum
of $3725, his debt aforesaid, with interest at ten per cent. per annum from the 1st of March 1856."
In August 1875, the appellees, as surviving partners of the firm
of Brown, Goddin '& Co., instituted the present action in the
Campbell Circuit Court, alleging the recovery under the proceedings to revive for the amount of the original judgment; that the
defendant was served with process, and made defence; that the
judgment was in full force unsatisfied, and they were entitled to
recover, &c. A demurrer to this petition was overruled; an
amended petition was, however, filed by the appellees, in which it
is alleged that tire judqment set up in the original petition was
based on tiw judgment rendered on the 21st of .arch 1856; that
this last-named judgment, under the statute of Ohio, becoming
dormant, the same was revived by the judgment mentioned in the
original petition, and the same was now in full force, and they
were entitled to have and recover the full amount thereof from
the defendant.
The appellant filed an answer to the petition as amended, in
which it was alleged that the so-called judgment, dated the 5th
of June 1875, was simply an order made under the statute of
Ohio reviving the judgment of the 21st of March 1856; this
statute reads : "If execution should not be sued out within five
years from the date of any judgment that now is, or may hereafter
be, rendered in any court of record in this state, or if five years
shall have intervened between the date of the last execution issued
on such judgment and the time of issuing out another writ of execution thereon, such judgment shall become dormant, and shall
cease to operate as a lien on the estate of the judgment-debtor."
That the judgment of the 21st of March 1856, constituting the
only cause of action against appellant, was rendered more than
fifteen years prior to the commencement of the present action, and
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he pleaded and relied on the Statute of Limitations in such cases
made and provided in bar of the action, and further alleged that
no execution was ever issued on the judgment of the 21st of March
1856, or that of the 5th of June 1875.
By the second paragraph of the answer, it was alleged that the
judgment was obtained by fraud, and his appearance to the original
action entered without his authority or knowledge. The third
paragraph was to the effect that the order of revivor was still
pending and undetermined, as he bad appealed froin the same.
The record of the original judgment, as well as the petition to
revive, was made part of the pleading by appellant, from" which it
appeared that no execution could issue on thejudgument, and that
the proceeding to revive was to give vitality to the judgment, so as
it might operate as a lien upon the estate of the debtor. A
demurrer to each paragraph of the appellant's answer was sustained by the court, exceptions taken, and the appellant failing to
plead further, a judgment was rendered against him, of which be
now complains.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-As to the third paragraph of the answer, we are
disposed to adjudge that the remedy sought upon the judgment
will not be denied the appellee, for the reason only that an action is
pending upon the same judgment in another state. There is no allegation that the judgment has been superseded or annulled, and we
must give to it the effect of a final judgment between the parties.
As to the second paragraph of the answer, conceding the statements therein contained to present a defence, it is sufficient to say
the record discloses that the same defence -was made upon the
hearing to revive the judgment, proof taken, and the judgment
revived. Such being the state of the record, the same matters
cannot be relied on as a defence to the present action.
The Statute of Limitations in this state in actions upon judgments
is, "that an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of this
state, or of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof,
the period to be computed from the date of the last execution
thereon," &c., shall be commenced -within fifteen years after the
cause of action first accrued.
It is insisted by counsel for the appellees that to sustain such a
defence would be to violate that provision of the Federal Constitu-
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tion which declares that "full faith and creaft shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of
every other state," and also the Act of Congress passed in 1790,
declaring that " the records and judicial proceedings authenticated
as aforesaid shall have full faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the states from whence the records are or may be taken."
This court, in the case of )?ogers v. Coleman, Hardin 415, held
that the full faith and credit required by the Constitution and Act
of Congress to be given to records abroad is just such as would be
given them at home. The meaning of this is, that a judgment
rendered by the court of a sister state having the jurisdiction will
not be questibned on the merits, only in so far as it can be assailed
in the court where the judgment was rendered.
It is equally as well established that the limitation law of the
state where the remedy is sought, and not that where the parties
may happen to live or the transaction entered into, must govern:
Bennett v. Devlin, 17 B. Monroe 398; Graves v. Graves, 2 Bibb
207. In this state the lapse of fifteen years without issuing an execution will bar any further proceedings on the judgment, and
where an execution issues on such a judgment, the court on motion
will quash it: Lockhart v. Gieger, 2 Bush 231.
It is obvious that if the judgment of 1874 had been prosecuted in
this state instead of the state of Ohio, the plea of the Statute of
Limitations would have prevented a recovery, and to deny the
efficacy of the plea in the present case would be to adjudge that
the remedy to enf6rce the judgment in the state of Ohio had become a vested right in the appellees by reason of article 4 of section
1 of the Federal Constitution, and the Act of Congress made in
pursuance thereof. Such a ruling would give the creditor, when
the judgment was rendered in another state, a remedy denied to
the citizen of Kentucky in attempting to enforce a judgment rendered in a home court. "The right to a particular remedy is not
a vested right. As a general rule, every state has complete control
over the remedies which it offers to suitors in its courts:" Cooley's
Const. Limit., 3d ed., p. 361.
In the case of .Mc.Elmoyfle v. Cohen, 13 Pet., it is said that the
faith and credit to be given to such judgments is, "t h at they are
record evidence of a debt or judgments of record, to be contested
in such a way as judgments of record may be, or such as inquire
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into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment was given.'
Again, "the Statute of Limitations is a plea to the remedy, and
consequently, the lex fori must prevail." The question in the
ease cited was " whether the Statute of Limitations of Georgia
could be pleaded to an action in that state, founded upon a judgment rendered in the state of South Carolina. The court entertained no doubt as to the right of the party to interpose such a
defence, and that such action must be brought within the period
prescribed by the lxfori, or the suit will be barred" Story's Conflict of Laws, p. 726.
The attention of the court has been called to section 18 of article
4, chapter 71, of the General Statutes, which providds that where,
by the laws of the state or country where the judgment was rendered, no action can be maintained upon it by reason of the lapse
of time, or is incapable of being otherwise enforced there, no action
upon the same can be maintained in this state.
This cannot be construed as a legislative interpretation of the
principal point made in this ease, or to dispense with the remedy
afforded parties in the defence of such actions.
The same provision, by a subsequent section of the same statute, is made to apply to all causes of action arising in another state
or country; if barred by the law of the state where the cause of
action accrued, it const.ituted a defence under the statute if the
party seeks to enforce his right in the courts of this state. To
this extent the rule is qualified, and in the absence of any declaration of the legislative intention making the Statute of Limitations
of other states apply in all cases where the cause of action accrued.
in such states, we are not disposed to overturn a principle too well
settled at this day to admit of controversy.
The exception made by the statute indicates an intention to
make no further innovation upon a wise rule of law calculated to
prevent any confusion in the attempt to enforce such rights. As
said by the Supreme Court, in the case already referred to, "the
legislature of a state may fix different times for barring remedy
upon judgments out of the state, and those rendered in its own
tribunals. There is no direct constitutional inhibition upon the
states, nor any clause in the constitution from which it can be even
plausibly inferred that the states may not legislate upon the remedy
in suits upon the judgment of other states, exclusive of all interference with their merits.
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The remaining and most important inquiry is as to the effect of
the proceeding of September 1874, to revive the judgment of the
21st of March 1856.
It seems that by the statute of Ohio, a judgment operates as a
lien on the estate of the defendant, and upon a failure to issue an
execution for the period of five years from its rendition the lien
terminates until there is a revivor by which the dormant judgment
is again vitalized, so that it may operate as a lien on the estate of
the debtor. The mere order of revivor, by virtue of such a statute,
constituted no cause of action, and is only a remedy afforded by
which the original judgment may be enforced. So far as the record
shows, no execution had been issued for near eighteen years from
the date of thjudgment; and if there had been no revivor necessary by the law of Ohio to create this lien, and the appellees entitled to their execution after the lapse of eighteen years, still, if an
attempt was made to enforce the judgment in this state, although
in fall life in the state of Ohio, the limitation of fifteen years would
operate as a complete bar to the recovery, and the mere remedy
afforded by the law of Ohio, under which the dormant condition
of the judgment is removed, so as to permit an execution to issue,
cannot be said to be another judgment on the same claim, but is in
fact only in aid of the original judgment. Such has been the construction of the statute by the courts of Ohio. "There is no new
judgment recovered on the scire facias to revive a dormant judgment, but the old one is called into action :" .Norton v. Beaver. 5
Ohio 178.
The order of revivor was simply restoring a lien that had been
lost by reason of the failure on the part of the creditor to issue his
execution. If this lien had continued in full force and effect during this whole period by the laws of Ohio, with the right to issue
an execution at any time, it cannot affect the question as to the
remedy when an attempt is made to enforce the judgment- in this
court, tliejudgment alone being the foundation of the action. After
the lapse of fifteen years the remedy upon the judgment in the
courts of this state was barred, and the order of revivor being in
aid only of the judgment, or the means of enforcing it, does not
take it out of the statute. Judgment is reversed, and cause remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer to the plea of the
Statute of Limitations, and for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion.

